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Sophocles' Oedipus: Evidence and Self-Conviction. By

FREDERICK AHL. Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press, 1991. Pp. xii + 297. $41.50 (cloth), $12.95
(paper).
The argument of this book is that Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus is not about
Oedipus' discovery that he has killed his father and married his mother, but rather
about Oedipus' unwarranted leap to the conclusion that he has done these things in
the face of evidence that is inconclusive and insufficiently examined. While most
classicists wiH want to dismiss this unorthodox thesis as eccentric and absurd, it
does deserve to be taken seriously. There is some striking textual evidence to sup
port Ahl's interpretation, and he is not the only critic to advance it. We owe A. a
willingness to try to think ourselves out of our inherited vision of this classic work;
in turn, we can expect from him answers to two questions: What do we stand to
gain by relinquishing our familiar understanding of the Oedipus Tyrannus as a play
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about the inescapability of fate? And why has almost no one understood the play
correctly-by A.'s lights-in the last twenty-five hundred years?
A.'s book has an important precursor in an article by Sandor Goodhart that appeared in Diacritics in 1978: "Al]cr'ta~ ~EqiamCE: Oedipus and Laius' Many Murderers." Goodhart concentrates on the most conspicuous flaw in the evidence on
which Oedipus convicts himself of the murder of Laius: the discrepancy between
the claim of the one surviving witness that Laius was killed by a group of men and
the recollection of Oedipus that he was the sole killer of the old man he met on the
way from Delphi to Thebes. Sophocles underscores this discrepancy when he has
Oedipus, as he waits for that witness to appear, stress to Jocasta his hope that the
witness will confirm that the murderers of Laius were many and so will exonerate
Oedipus (OT 842-47). Yet Oedipus fails to pursue this question when the witness
arrives. This is because the intervening visit of the Corinthian messenger has
shifted Oedipus' focus to the more pressing question of his own identity; the witness to the murder has become more interesting in his other role as the shepherd
who gave the infant raised by Polybus and Merope to the Corinthian.
A. surveys the entire play and finds that, in every episode, Oedipus similarly
accepts inadequate evidence against himself without examining it carefully. This
epistemological disaster is fostered both by Oedipus' own personality and by the
personalities of his informants. Oedipus is obsessed with himself and with his
fears about the crimes prophesied for him, while his informants, consistently motivated by self-interest, play on Oedipus' fears to further their own ends. For
example, Oedipus unquestioningly accepts the idea that the plague in Thebes is
linked to Laius' death even though that is an interpretation advanced by Creon of
an oracle for which Creon is the only source. Despite the suspicions of Creon that
he later voices, Oedipus fails to notice that Creon is manipulating him as part of a
subtle-and successful-plot to become ruler of Thebes.
Similarly, according to A., Oedipus allows Teiresias to stimulate his doubts
about his own paternity without presenting any evidence, forgetting that Teiresias
may resent him because of his success with the Sphinx. On the basis of what he is
told by the Corinthian, Oedipus comes to the consequential conclusion that he is
not the son of Polybus but a foundling. Yet the Corinthian contradicts himself, saying at one point that he came upon the infant Oedipus on Mt. Cithaeron (OT 1026),
but a few lines later that he received him from someone else (OT 1038-40). He
also contradicts the drinking companion who first raised Oedipus' doubts about
this paternity: that man implied Oedipus had been presented to Polybus by Merope
(OT782), the Corinthian says that he himself gave him to Polybus (OT 1022). And
the Corinthian is an unreliable informant because he is openly motivated by the
hope of a reward when Oedipus takes over Polybus' throne (OT 1005-6) and therefore can be expected to say whatever will lead Oedipus to think it would be safe to
return to Corinth.
Oedipus' decision that he is the murderer of Laius and the son of Laius and Jocasta comes in his encounter with the old Theban servant who is both the eyewitness to the murder and the servant to whom Jocasta-as the servant claims (OT
1173), but she implies it was Laius (OT717-19)-gave the infant to be exposed.
Yet if that servant really did witness the murder, his very existence contradicts
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Oedipus' memory that he killed all of the men in the group he encountered; if he
did not, his trustworthiness is questionable.
In developing this interpretation, A. makes arguments most of us have been
trained to view as illegitimate because they observe no distinction between literature and life. He rejects the principle enunciated in particular by Roland Barthes
that the characters in literature must not be treated as if they were real people. He
freely attributes to Sophocles' characters experiences that transcend the words of
Sophocles' text, asserting, for example, that when Creon says he has no interest in
political power he is really thinking the opposite, or that when Creon arouses Oedipus to anger he is deliberately provoking a type of behavior he has witnessed many
times in the past.
A. often finds psychological significance in what most critics would class as literary devices. When Oedipus tells the Corinthian messenger about the circumstances of his own departure from Corinth, A. does not see this as an expedient by
which Sophocles conveys this information to his audience, but comments that "it is
curious that Oedipus so readily accepts the anonymous stranger as confessor here"
(p. 170). When Jocasta suggests that Oedipus enter the house, this is not a sign that
Sophocles wants to clear the stage for the chorus, but evidence that she feels the
need for a private conversation. When the Corinthian answers Oedipus' question
about how Polybus died by saying, "a small stroke lays old bodies to rest" (OT
961), the generality of his statement is a sign of suspicious equivocation on the
speaker's part rather than a feature of Sophoclean style. In general, Sophocles as
the poet who shapes an artificial representation of experience tends to disappear
from A.'s account to be replaced by wholly autonomous characters.
It is much easier to register unease with these arguments than it is to refute them
conclusively. Any coherent understanding of a literary character requires some
embroidery on hints given by the text, and it is hard to lay down rules for when to
draw the line. Most readers of the play would claim that when Creon says he has
never craved power, he should be believed, but that when Oedipus says that he has
been suspecting Creon of treachery, he probably should not be believed: he says
this in a defensive response to Teiresias' declarations and we certainly should not
think he had suspicions that would, as A. would have it, make it notably odd that
he sent Creon to Delphi in the first place. And yet it is hard to offer an iron-clad
justification for this variable skepticism, which largely stems from the assumption
that Creon exists in the play only to further the presentation of Oedipus and therefore is not depicted in the same psychological depth.
Furthermore, embracing logical inconsistencies as a by-product of literariness
means finding sloppiness in a play that is regularly praised as a masterwork of
accomplished plot construction and renouncing the critical principle that works of
literature repay close reading with minute attention to detail. It is not an accident
that A.'s closest allies in a way turn out to be scholarly commentators with an eye
for textual problems, such as R. C. Jebb and especially R. D. Dawe, who often
have noted the same discrepancies, although without drawing the same conclusions. For example, both A. and Dawe note that the text gives confusing information about whether the witness to Laius' death first returned to Thebes immediately
after the killing or only after Oedipus had arrived and established himself there.
Dawe can only censure this as a flaw in Sophocles' workmanship: "More serious
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perhaps than the offence against real life logic is the offence against dramatic likelihood" (R. D. Dawe, ed., "Oedipus Rex" [Cambridge, 1982], p. 16); for A., the
confusion is a creative way of evoking doubt about the evidence against Oedipus.
Because the Oedipus Tyrannus is concerned with the detection of crimes, it foregrounds the parallel, which so engaged Aristotle, between the lawyer's task of persuading jurors in a courtroom that something has happened and the poet's task of
persuading viewers in a theater that something has happened. A. forces us to consider why we are willing to accept flimsier evidence in viewing a play than we
would in judging a trial.
While A.'s method of reading provides a bracing challenge to our familiar critical habits, he is less successful than Goodhart in answering the two questions raised
above about what larger purpose this radical rereading might serve and why it has
never surfaced before. Drawing on a variety of contemporary theories, most prominently those of Jacques Derrida and Rene Girard, Goodhart sees both Oedipus and
Sophocles' audience as caught up in the "idolatry of the Oedipal perspective," an irrational willingness to understand human actions as shaped by the inevitability of
parricide and incest. We all evince a tendency to self-incrimination that leads us to
grant authority to pronouncements that these crimes are inevitable: thus Oedipus
comes to believe the Delphic oracle, and Sophocles' readers acquiesce in his conclusions because they are motivated by the same impulses. For modern readers this
inclination is reinforced by Freudian psychoanalysis, which recapitulates the oracle's pronouncement, now making parricide and incest desires to be found in every
psyche rather than the destined actions of a particular individual.
Not only does Goodhart succeed in explaining why Sophocles' audiences have
routinely ignored the play's hints that Oedipus is not necessarily guilty, but his position is humane: learning to see our acceptance of the traditional Oedipus myth as
idolatry promises to liberate us from a constraining vision of human nature as inescapably criminal. Furthermore, Goodhart, following Girard, identifies the social as
well as the psychological forces that help to promote this idolatry: Oedipus' selfincrimination is one example of the scapegoating mechanism through which societies control violence by channelling it against a single victim who is imagined to
be more criminal than everyone else. The Girardian dimension of Goodhart's argument is especially appealing because it provides a framework within which the
particular discrepancy in the evidence from which Goodhart starts is itself significant: Oedipus' decision that Laius had a single murderer rather than many neatly
illustrates the process of scapegoating.
A. is less clear about what the point of adopting this view of the play would be.
He seems to think much of the time that Sophocles is portraying Oedipus as a sociopath surrounded by mean-spirited self-seekers with no interest in helping him arrive at the truth. He reads Oedipus through the lens of Plato's descriptions in the
Republic of dangerously irrational souls, branding him as "egocentric and paranoid;
the very embodiment of Plato's tyrannical soul ... " (p. 262). According to A., Oedipus' egotism can be seen in the way he turns his attention from the problems of
Thebes to the question of his own identity; in his inability to recognize that others
may have motives that serve their own interests rather than his; and in his inclination
to make himself a scapegoat, which stems from a desire for self-aggrandizement.
Rather than being admired for his willingness to be punished, he is to be faulted for
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abandoning Thebes to the disastrous consequences that follow on his departure. Few
readers will feel that this repellent characterization answers to their own experience
of the play or that it offers much compensation for the suspension of their usual critical standards.
A. at one point attributes the pervasiveness of the more orthodox interpretation
to the undue influence of Seneca's Oedipus, but he also claims that we, by believing that Oedipus is correct, are making the same mistake he is and that "perhaps
this is precisely the trap into which Sophocles would have us fall" (p. x). But he
never develops the implications of our identification with Oedipus in view of his
image of Oedipus as representing the extreme negative behavior associated with
tyrants. In fact, by portraying Oedipus so negatively for making interpretative
errors that most readers of the play replicate, A. seems to be engaging in some
unacknowledged scapegoating of his own.
The question of how we are to understand Sophocles' intentions is key to any
attempt to assess this approach. Both Goodhart and A. write as if their interpretation describes Sophocles' conscious aims, but it is hard to believe that Sophocles
himself really meant to present Oedipus in the OT as deluded, despite A.'s reminders that there was wide variation in the presentation of traditional myths in
tragedy and that Sophocles lived in a climate of considerable skepticism towards
the Delphic oracle. In adducing evidence for Sophocles' intentions, A. never deals
with the Oedipus Coloneus, which, despite its lateness, clearly looks back to the
Oedipus Tyrannus. There Sophocles develops a position on Oedipus' past crimes
that involves both insisting that they happened and relieving Oedipus of the burden of responsibility for them. This, like Freud's vision of the psychoanalytic
cure, is a humane response to Oedipus' situation from within the Oedipal perspective, and it does not square well with an earlier depiction of Oedipus as guilty
only in his own imagination. In any case, the Oedipus Coloneus surely has played
at least as much of a role as Seneca's Oedipus in fostering the canonical interpretation of the Oedipus Tyrannus.
The approach of A. and Goodhart would be more fruitful if it were detached
from the claim to identify Sophocles' intentions. There is no reason why we cannot
include Sophocles among those who have been under the sway of the Oedipal perspective, seeing him, like the Oedipus he created and like Freud who appropriated
that Oedipus as a model for the human psyche, as determined to affirm an Oedipal
vision. The critic's task would then be to locate the forces that caused Sophocles to
leave so many conspicuous loose ends in making his case, whether in the slipperiness of language, as a deconstructionist might, or in the author's unconscious, as a
Freudian might.
This approach to the Oedipus Tyrannus works best as an instance of the instructive
practice of reading texts with a critical rather than an automatically sympathetic attitude towards the author's intentions. If we are going to insist on Sophocles' role in
actively shaping the play we have, we should also consider that he did not have to
shape it exactly as he did. One of the most eye-opening effects of A.'s book is that it
shows us how different the action of the play looks if we focus on the viewpoints of
characters other than Oedipus. This allows us to see not what these characters actually experienced, since they really do not exist outside the play, but what vistas
Sophocles has attempted to foreclose by directing our attention to one central

BooK REvrnws

167

character. A. is also excellent at revealing how much the realization of the author's
intentions depends on the complicity of his readers. Some of the best moments in the
book are those in which he shows how modern translators have misrepresented the
literal Greek text in order to help Sophocles convey more clearly what they are sure
he meant. Adding this approach to our arsenal of perspectives on the play would not
prevent us from attempting to elicit Sophocles' intentions and admiring the skill with
which he has fulfilled them, but it could help us to ask whether we have to surrender
ourselves to his vision. Through recognizing that the play gives us not only an op
portunity to identify with Oedipus' self-conviction, but also an opportunity to see
that Oedipus' conclusions are not inescapable, we may be better able to resist a lim
iting and defeatist view of human possibility.
Sheila Murnaghan
University of Pennsylvania

